This paper calculates a partial equilibrium version of the Anderson-Neary (2005) trade restrictiveness index (TRI) for the United States using nearly a century of data on import tariffs. The TRI is defined as the uniform tariff that yields the same welfare loss as an existing tariff structure. The results show that the standard import-weighted average tariff understates the TRI by about 75 percent over this period. This approach also yields annual estimates of the static welfare loss from the U.S. tariff structure over a period that encompasses the high-tariff protectionism of the late nineteenth century through the trade liberalization that began in the mid1930s. The deadweight losses are largest immediately after the Civil War, amounting to about one percent of GDP, but they fall almost continuously thereafter to less than one-tenth of one percent of GDP by the early 1960s. On average, import duties resulted in a welfare loss of 40 cents for every dollar of revenue generated, slightly higher than contemporary estimates of the marginal welfare cost of taxation.
For different attempts at reweighting the standard average tariff measure, see Lerdau 1 (1957) and Leamer (1974) .
Introduction
Economists have long sought to have a single numerical measure that summarizes the stance of a country's trade policy. The easiest way to measure a country's formal trade barriers is the import-weighted average tariff rate, which can be readily calculated by dividing the revenue from import duties by the value of total imports. Unfortunately, this measure has four critical shortcomings that make it a poor indicator of the tariff's height and static welfare cost.
First, the average tariff is downward biased: goods that are subject to high tariffs receive a low weight in the index, and goods that are subject to prohibitive tariffs will not be represented at all.
Second, the average tariff understates the welfare cost of a given tariff structure because it ignores the dispersion in import duties across goods. Third, the average tariff lacks any economic interpretation: an average tariff of 50 percent may or may not restrict trade more (or generate deadweight losses larger) than an average tariff of 25 percent. Fourth, the average tariff will not reflect the impact of non-tariff barriers, such as import quotas, in restricting trade.
Given these problems, economists as far back as Loveday (1929) However, there is a substantial gap between the ideal tariff index in theory and that which is computationally feasible. A major obstacle to implementing the TRI is that the requisite tariff weights -the marginal costs of the tariffs evaluated at an intermediate price vector -are not observable in practice. Therefore, Anderson and Neary calculate the TRI using a computable general equilibrium model to find the single uniform tariff that replicates the welfare cost of divergent duties across different goods. This method of determining the TRI is daunting:
computable general equilibrium models are data intensive and require estimates of numerous parameters, as well as critical assumptions about the structure of production and consumption. 2 As an alternative, Feenstra (1995) developed a simplified partial-equilibrium version of the TRI that can be calculated without resorting to complex general equilibrium simulations. Kee, Nicita, and Olarreaga (2008, 2009) have used this approach to evaluate the trade restrictiveness of tariff policy for 88 countries in the early 2000s. They find that the TRI and the import-weighted average tariff are highly correlated (correlation coefficient of 0.75), but that the TRI is about 80 percent higher than the average tariff because of the variance in tariff rates and the covariance between tariffs and import demand elasticities. They also calculate the static deadweight loss due to existing tariff regimes and finds that the welfare costs range from zero (Singapore) up to 3.05 percent of GDP (Egypt). reflecting the generally low level of trade barriers. This is unlikely to have been the case as one goes back further in time, however, when trade barriers were more extensive. Unfortunately, there is little existing information about the restrictiveness of trade policy or the magnitude of the welfare costs of protection at different points in time. Although historical analysis is usually 3 hampered by the lack of readily available data, the United States has sufficient information on import duties to make feasible a rough calculation of the TRI and the resulting deadweight losses for nearly a century. This paper calculates a highly simplified, annual trade restrictiveness index for the United States during a long period of its history (1859, based on a broad classification of imports derived from the U.S. tariff schedule. This period covers the classic era of high trade protectionism, when America's trade barriers were formidable, including the Smoot-Hawley tariff of 1930, through the period of trade liberalization after World War II. Throughout this period, U.S. import restrictions consisted almost exclusively of import duties, not non-tariff barriers such as import quotas or voluntary export restraints that would make a tariff-based TRI quite misleading. The results are very similar to Kee, Nicita, and Olarreaga's in two important respects: the TRI and import-weighted average tariff are highly correlated over time (correlation coefficient of 0.92), just as they were across countries, and the average tariff understates the TRI by about 75 percent, on average, similar to that found across countries.
The results also show how the static deadweight losses from U.S. tariffs evolved during a long period for which no estimates of the costs exist. In the decades after the Civil War, a time when the average tariff was around 30 percent, the deadweight losses from the tariff structure were considerable, amounting to about one percent of GDP. These losses fell steadily to less than one-tenth of one percent of GDP by the end of World War II. These welfare costs are relatively small largely because of the small share of trade in GDP. They declined over time because an increasing share of imports were given duty-free status and the remaining tariffs on dutiable imports were gradually reduced. Import duties also played an important public-finance role at this time; from 1867 to 1913, import duties raised about half of the federal government's revenue. The results here suggest that about 46 cents of deadweight loss were incurred for each dollar raised in revenue, making import duties only slightly less efficient than modern methods of revenue raising through income and sales taxes.
A Trade Restrictiveness Index for the United States
Anderson and Neary (2005) present the complete details on the theory behind the trade restrictiveness index. The standard average tariff measure and the trade restrictiveness index are both simply weighted averages of individual tariff rates. The weights in the average tariff measure are the actual import shares, whereas the weights in the TRI are the derivatives of the balance of trade function, which are not observable. However, Feenstra (1995 Feenstra ( , 1562 has shown that, under the special assumption of linear demand, a simplified TRI can be expressed as:
(1) n where the TRI is a weighted average of the squared tariff rates on each of n goods (ô ), with the nn weights (MC/ M p ) being the change in import expenditures as a result of a one percent change in the price, evaluated at free trade prices. Kee, Nicita, and Olarreaga (2008) rewrite this equation Dakhlia and Temimi (2006) note that the TRI is not uniquely defined for the large 4 country case.
The tariff data underlying the estimates of the TRI in this paper also include two to four 5 additional categories of imports: duty-free goods throughout the entire sample; manufactures of rayon (a new schedule starting in the Tariff of 1930); coffee and tea, which were large and taxable imports for several years after the Civil War; and duty-free goods subject to special duties starting in the 1930s. Some free list commodities were subject to special duties under the Revenue Act of 1932 and Section 446 of the Tariff Act of 1930. as:
where s is the share of imports of good n in GDP, å is the elasticity of import demand for good n n, and ô is the import tariff imposed on good n.
Equation (2) is a highly simplified, partial equilibrium version of the TRI designed to capture the first-order effects of trade barriers. The measure ignores cross-price effects on import demand and other general equilibrium interactions and implicitly assumes that world prices are given. Despite these simplifications, this expression for the TRI has the virtue of being 4 computationally straightforward and depends on the tariff structure, the elasticities of import demand, and the share of imports in GDP.
A. Historical Data on U.S. Import Tariffs
In this paper, a TRI is calculated using a limited disaggregation of U.S. imports based on will be compared with the results using highly disaggregated import data for selected years.) Although these tariff averages mask the dispersion of rates within each tariff schedule, there is still significant variation in the average duties across the classifications. However, the structure of the tariff rates across these schedules was persistent over time, i.e., the goods that received high tariffs in the late nineteenth century were the same in the mid-twentieth century as well.
The Spearman rank correlation of the tariffs in effect in 1890 with those in 1910 was 0.96, 0.61 in 1920, 0.82 in 1930, 0.94 in 1940, and 0.74 in 1950 .
B. Elasticities of Import Demand
To be theoretically consistent with the Anderson-Neary index, Kee, Nicita, and 8
Olarreaga (2008) estimate GDP-maximizing elasticities of import demand, which measure the change in the share of good n in GDP when the price of the good increases by one percent.
Lipsey (1963) presents import price and volume data for various categories of imports 9 for the period 1879 to 1923, but they do not match up with the tariff categories. Another consideration is that the estimated elasticities depend upon a particular econometric functional form. As Marquez (1994 Marquez ( , 1999 points out, there are various methodologies for estimating aggregate trade elasticities and each one can yield quite different results. Kee, Kicita, and Olarreaga (2008) undertake the enormous task of estimating more than 375,000 tariff-line import demand elasticities (i.e., those for 4,800 goods in 117 countries) using data from 1988 to 2002. This estimation requires annual data on aggregate factor endowments as well as detailed information on the prices and values of imports. Even then, the available time series data are so short that estimation is feasible only by exploiting a cross-country panel of data.
The TRI calculation also requires estimates of elasticities of import demand.
8
Unfortunately, estimating these elasticities is virtually impossible for the period considered by this paper because disaggregated import price and quantity data either do not exist or do not match up with the tariff categories. Rather than attempt to estimate the import demand 9 elasticities, existing studies of these elasticities must be turned to. Stern, Francis, and Schumacher (1976) present a wealth of disaggregated import demand elasticities from different studies estimated for sample periods ranging from the 1950s through the early 1970s. They report the "best" elasticity estimates for categories of goods at the three-digit SITC level that provide a reasonable match to the tariff classification in Table 1 , where they are reported (column A). The TRI calculations using these best-guess estimates will be considered as a benchmark. The results will be compared with those using the import demand elasticities estimated by Shiells, Stern, and Deardorff (1986) , Ho and Jorgenson (1994), and Kreinin (1973) in columns B, C, and D, respectively. These alternative elasticity estimates are also reported at a level of aggregation that comes close to matching the tariff categories used here.
There is no doubt that this approach is a highly imperfect substitute for estimating historical elasticities. The import demand elasticities could have changed a great deal over time,
Even the highly disaggregated import demand elasticities estimated by Kee, Nicita, 10 and Olarreaga (2008) mainly fall within these narrow bounds. They find that the estimated (weighted average) elasticity for the United States at a three-digit level of import disaggregation is -1.14 while at the six-digit level of disaggregation it is -1.74.
In their general equilibrium model, with CES preferences for final goods, the TRI is a 11 function of the mean and variance of the tariffs alone, and both of these are independent of the elasticities, which therefore do not matter at all. Second, it turns out that the calculated TRI is very insensitive to the elasticities used.
Anderson and Neary (2005, 293) observe that varying the elasticities is "not very influential" in affecting the TRI because, as equation (2) indicates, the elasticities appear in both the numerator and denominator and hence cancel each other out. Indeed, the component of the TRI that 11 depends upon the elasticities is very small in the U.S. case. As Kee, Nicita, and Olarreaga note, the TRI can be decomposed into three components: the average tariff, the variance of the tariff, and the covariance of the tariff rates and the elasticities of import demand. This can be expressed as:
Annual data on nominal GDP is from Johnston and Williamson (2006) .
12
The annual TRI calculations are reported in an appendix.
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where 2 ô is the import-weighted average tariff, ó is the import-weighted variance of the tariff 2 nn rates (3s(ô -ô 2 ) , and ñ = cov (å /å 2 , ô ), where å /å 2 is the import-weighted average elasticity (i.e., 22 the elasticity for good n, re-scaled by the average elasticity). The trade-restrictiveness of a system of tariffs is increasing in the average tariff, the variance of the tariff rates, and the covariance of the tariffs and the import-demand elasticities (i.e., trade is more restricted when higher duties are imposed on imports for which demand is more elastic). The import-demand elasticities only matter for the covariance term and, in practice, as we shall see, the covariance is a very small factor relative to the average tariff and variance of the tariff in determining the TRI.
In other words, we can still come up with a reasonable approximation of the TRI even without good information about the elasticities.
The final ingredient is the ratio of imports under each tariff classification to GDP. The 12 total share is very small during the period from 1867 to 1961, about 5 percent on average. It should be noted that "imports for consumption" are used rather than "total imports" (which include goods later reexported) and that this includes only imports of merchandise goods and not total goods and services.
C. An Annual TRI Index weighted average tariff. The next lines add tariff variance and the tariff-elasticity covariance to the TRI. The tariff variance contributes most to the TRI beyond the average tariff, while the covariance term is very small in comparison. Thus, the TRI depends almost entirely upon the mean and variance of the tariff rates, which are independent of the import demand elasticities, rather than the covariance of the tariff rates and elasticities. If the covariance between the tariff rates and the elasticities is positive, the TRI is slightly higher than the average tariff and tariff variance; if the covariance is negative, the TRI is slightly lower than the average tariff and tariff variance. For nearly a third of the sample, concentrated in the late nineteenth century, the covariance between the tariffs and import demand elasticities is negative. This may reflect the historically important revenue-raising function of the tariff, which implies that high tariffs should be imposed on goods with low elasticities of demand, as is clearly the case with the high duties on imports of sugar, tobacco, and alcoholic beverages.
14 The TRI-A is highly correlated with the standard import-weighted average tariff. The correlation coefficient is 0.92, similar to the 0.75 correlation coefficient between the average tariff and the TRI across many countries in the early 2000s found by Kee, Nicita, and Olarreaga (2008) . Both the average tariff and the TRI are quite volatile over time, and much of the 15 volatility is due to the effect of changes in import prices on the ad valorem equivalent of specific duties, which constituted about two-thirds of all import duties throughout this period (Irwin 1998a ). Olarreaga (2008, 679) found that the TRI is about 80 percent higher than the import-weighted average tariff, on average, across many countries. In this case considered here, the largest deviations are found during periods of significant tariff changes, such as the 1910s and the 1930s, when tariff rates were adjusted and import price movements were large. In addition, the deviations are relatively small when the average tariff is high, but become more pronounced when the average tariff is relatively low. These findings give us some perspective on the longstanding concern that the average tariff measure is significantly biased. As Rodríguez and Rodrik (2001, 316) The results here suggest that the standard average tariff measure is highly correlated with a better measure of trade restrictiveness, but that it understates it by a considerable margin. Therefore, the conclusion of this exercise is that calculating something like a TRI is useful because the average tariff ignores the variance in tariff rates across different goods.
The Annual Deadweight Loss from U.S. Tariffs
The reduced-form TRI in equation (2) also yields a linear approximation of the static deadweight welfare loss that is identical to the standard formula popularized by Johnson (1960) .
The formula for the deadweight loss as a share of GDP is (4) . Kee, Nicita, and Olarreaga (2008) show that this formula can be divided into the three elements that define the TRI, namely, the tariff average, the tariff variance, and the tariff-elasticity covariance:
(5) .
Unlike the TRI, the calculated deadweight loss is sensitive to the elasticities of import demand.
However, it is sensitive to the average elasticity, not so much to the covariance between the tariffs and the elasticities, which once again will be a small component of the calculation.
The standard static welfare calculation of the costs of protection have many well-known limitations that are worth repeating. They ignore general equilibrium and cross-price effects.
The calculations understate the deadweight losses by ignoring the costs of rent-seeking (Krueger 1974), the dynamic gains from trade in terms of productivity improvements (Pavcnik 2002 ), the benefits of product variety (Broda and Weinstein 2004) , and the endogeneity of protection (Trefler 1993, Lee and Swagel 1997 estimates compare with more recent estimates. Table 2 reports the deadweight loss calculation for selected years. Figure 4 plots the annual deadweight loss from the tariff as a percent of GDP using the three components in equation 5. Once again, the average tariff and the tariff variance dominate the deadweight loss (DWL) calculation, and the contribution of the tariff-elasticity covariance is negligible. The figure suggests that the DWL from tariffs was highest in the late nineteenth century, amounting to about one percent of GDP in the late 1860s and early 1870s. By 1910, the DWL declined to about one half of one percent of GDP. By the end of World War II, the DWL had fallen to almost negligible levels.
A. Historical Calculations for the United States
Of course, as noted earlier, after 1961, the deadweight loss from tariffs alone would be 17 a misleading indicator of the costs of U.S. trade restrictions because of the increasing use of export restraints agreements, first in textiles and steel and later other goods.
The welfare loss was much lower in 1859, when tariff rates were lower and much more 18 uniform (only ad valorem duties were used from 1846 to 1860). Figure 5 shows the variation in the DWL calculation depending upon the different elasticities used. These calculations are bounded by DWLs that assume average elasticities of -1 and -3. Therefore, without solid information on the average elasticity of import demand, one cannot have a great deal of confidence in a precise figure that accurately represents the DWL of the tariffs at any given moment. The figure indicates that it is more appropriate to refer to a broad range within which the welfare loss is likely to fall. For example, in the late nineteenth century (the 1880s and 1890s), the calculated deadweight loss falls in the range of 0.5 to 0.9 percent of GDP. This range, however, narrows considerably with time; by the 1920s, the differences in the calculations are negligible. As noted earlier, the United States did not employ many non-tariff barriers on imports (such quantitative restrictions) during this long period so that these figures should represent a reasonable confidence interval on the total static deadweight loss as a result of trade barriers.
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How does the time-series pattern of deadweight losses contribute to our understanding of the evolution of U.S. trade policy? It is not surprising that the highest costs of U.S. tariff policy came immediately after the Civil War, the heyday of America's late nineteenth century hightariff policy. High and comprehensive duties on imports were imposed during the war and remained in place for several years after the war in order to raise revenue for the federal government. Only a tiny share of imports was allowed to enter the country without paying any 18 duties. If the static welfare cost was about one percent of GDP, the associated redistribution of income was obviously much higher -at about eight percent of GDP, according to Irwin (2007) .
This large redistribution and associated deadweight loss may be one reason why the political debate over trade policy was much more intense in the late nineteenth century than it has been since. By the mid-twentieth century, the deadweight loss had fallen to about one-tenth of one percent of GDP, which not only makes the historical figures of one percent of GDP seem much larger, but partly explains why, after the early 1930s, trade policy was no longer a leading political issue in the country as it had been in the late nineteenth century. Simply put, the economic stakes were no longer as high.
The first major change in the tariff code after the Civil War occurred in 1873, when coffee, tea, and other consumption items were put on the duty-free list. Because imports of these commodities were quite large (coffee and tea alone accounted for 8 percent of U.S. imports in 1870), the share of U.S. imports that entered duty free rose from less than five percent prior to 1870 to nearly 30 percent. As a result, the deadweight cost of the tariff dropped significantly in the early 1870s. The next significant change was the McKinley tariff of 1890, which temporarily put sugar on the duty-free list, followed by the Wilson-Gorman Tariff of 1894. Both of these acts helped push up the share of duty-free imports to about 50 percent of total imports and further reduced the welfare losses from the tariff, although this was partially reversed by the Dingley Tariff restrictions and trade protection. This tariff generally increased protective tariffs on dutiable imports, such as iron and steel and textiles, but the TRI and the deadweight loss fell substantially because the legislation gave duty-free status to large swath of imports (Irwin 1998b) . The average tariff on dutiable imports might be a better broad indicator of trade protection in the sense of assisting import-competing producers. reversed this short-term trend (Irwin 1998a) . By the late 1940s, the TRI and the deadweight losses were at extremely low levels.
Thus, many of the big changes in the TRI and DWLs over time have been the result of shifting large categories of imports on (and off) the duty-free list. Figure 6 shows several large discrete jumps in the share of imports that receive duty-free treatment. This suggest that the TRI and the average tariff on imports are not good measures of trade "protection" in the sense of sheltering domestic producers from import competition. Many U.S. imports do not compete with domestic production (such as coffee, tea, silk, tropical fruits, etc.) and are often allowed to enter without paying any duties, depending upon the revenue requirements of the government. Thus, a substantial portion of imports may not subject to any trade limitations even as imports that compete with domestic producers are severely restricted. Even if the overall TRI is low, imports of goods that affect domestic producers could still be burdened with heavy barriers. Other non-TRI-based estimates of the costs of protection for the U.S. economy, which are also summarized on Table 2 , also provide a comparison to the estimates here and bring them upto-date. Of course, what has been true in recent decades has not always been true. Still, such findings have prompted economists, such as Feenstra (1992) and Panagariya (2002) , to question whether the costs of protection could really be so low.
There are two fundamental reasons for the relatively low cost of protection reported here.
First, the United States has always had a large domestic economy that was not very dependent upon international trade. The ratio of merchandise imports to GDP has historically been very low in comparison to other countries, at about 6 percent, even during the post World War II period when import tariffs were low. Only since the early 1970s did the U.S. import share begin to increase to its current level of about 14 percent.
Second, for most of its history, the United States has not used highly distortionary trade policy instruments, such as import quotas and import licenses, to block trade. Instead, it has usually employed import tariffs, which -compared with the alternatives -are a much more
De Melo and Tarr (1992) examined trade protection for the steel, automobiles, and 21 textile industries in the mid-1980s and found that $14.7 billion of the $21.1 billion economic loss was due to quota rents, only $6.4 billion (0.16 percent of GDP) due to the domestic distortionary cost.
efficient method of restricting trade. The problem with import quotas is that the foregone quota rents are orders of magnitude larger than the tariff-induced distortions to resource allocation. For example, the cost of U.S. trade restrictions was much higher in the 1970s and 1980s than decades before or after because quantitative restrictions and voluntary export restraints were used to limit imports of textiles and apparel, automobiles, iron and steel, semiconductors, and other products Finally, it should be emphasized that the low costs of protection do not imply that the gains from trade are small; indeed, the gains from trade could be enormous. Rather, these results simply suggests that, in general, formal U.S. trade barriers have been at a very low level in recent decades.
C. Aggregation Bias
The calculations presented above indicate that the mean and variance of tariffs are the most important contributing factors to the TRI and DWL. The precise results have been based on the disaggregation of imports into 16 to 18 categories in the tariff schedule. However, as one further disaggregates the tariff code, the variance of tariffs is likely to increase, as Arce and Reinert (1994) suggest. As a check on the extent to which aggregation matters for the calculated TRI and DWLs, the most highly disaggregated import data available was used in calculations for selected years (1880, 1900, 1928, and 1938) . These results are reported on Table 3 . Rather than assign a particular elasticity value to each of the thousands of items in the import data, a uniform elasticity of -2 has been assumed in each case reported in Table 3 to ensure comparability. When the elasticities of import demand are assumed to be uniform across import categories, the tariffelasticity covariance is implicitly set to zero (in which case the particular elasticity chosen does not affect the calculation of the TRI). As noted earlier, the tariff-elasticity covariance is only a tiny component of the TRI and for much of the early sample the covariance is negative, meaning that assuming a zero covariance between the elasticities and the import tariffs will slightly overstate the TRI in earlier samples and slightly understate it in later samples.
The results show that disaggregation -essentially adding more variance to the tariff structure -matters a great deal for the TRI and DWL, but only up to a point. Moving from the simple average tariff to about 16 import categories increases the TRI and the DWL by almost a factor of two in each case. However, moving from 16 categories to more than 2,000 categories increases the TRIs and DWLs somewhat more, but not much more. This seems to imply limited gains from further disaggregation, at least in these cases. Yet is also suggests that any particular calculation that does not disaggregate to the fullest possible extent will understate, to some extent, the TRI and DWL.
D. Average Welfare Cost per Dollar of Revenue
From 1867 While the average welfare cost per dollar revenue a century ago is roughly comparable to the marginal welfare cost more recently, any direct comparison is problematic. In particular, the average cost of tariffs is likely to be significantly lower than the marginal cost of those tariffs, invalidating the comparison. Still, although in principle a consumption or sales tax should raise more revenue with less distortion than a tariff, import duties were probably much easier to collect and enforce in the late nineteenth century than other methods of taxation.
Conclusions
This paper presents a simplified trade restrictiveness index for the United States during a long period in its history when import tariffs were the only major policy impediment to international trade and formal non-tariff barriers (such as import quotas) were not prevalent. The results show that the commonly used import-weighted average tariff is highly correlated with the Anderson-Neary (2005) trade restrictiveness index, although it understates the index by about 75 percent, on average. This reinforces the conclusion that the variance of the tariff rates is a key consideration in the restrictiveness of a country's trade regime.
In addition, the paper presents annual estimates of static deadweight loss from the U.S.
tariff code for nearly a century. These annual calculations stand in sharp contrast to the isolated handful of estimates for individual years in the post-World War II period. Unlike the low deadweight loss estimates in recent decades, the results here indicate that the losses were quite large in the years immediately after the Civil War, at about one percent of GDP. Since then, they have declined secularly to less than one tenth of one percent of GDP by the end of World War II.
This decline in the welfare cost of U.S. import tariffs is due to the rising share of imports that were given duty free access to the domestic market and the decline in rates of import duty.
Historically, the cost of protection has been low for the United States because international trade has been a relatively small part of the overall economy and import tariffs are much less distortionary than other trade interventions, such as import quotas or import licences. In addition, import duties seems to have been a relatively efficient means of raising revenue: the average welfare cost per dollar revenue raised was about 40 cents during the period considered in this paper, somewhat higher than current estimates for the modern tax system. 
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